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The veto power originates in article 27(3) of the United Nations
Charter, which establishes that all substantive decisions of the Security
Council must be made with “the concurring votes of the permanent
members.” 2 Already controversial at the time of the 1945 San Francisco
Conference, 3 the veto today often negatively impacts on the work and
functioning of the Security Council. The proliferation of the use of the
veto in recent times has prevented the Security Council from exercising
its functions with respect to some of the gravest threats to international
peace and security – often in clear contravention of the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter. Even the mere threat of the veto has
prevented the Security Council from addressing situations that squarely
1.

Ambassador Christian Wenaweser is the Permanent Representative of
Liechtenstein to the United Nations, a position he has held since 2002.
Between 2008 and 2011 he also served as President of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC). In that role, he presided over the first Review Conference of the
ICC in 2010, which adopted amendments to the Rome Statute on the
Crime of Aggression and on extending the use of certain weapons as war
crimes in non-international conflicts.
Sina Alavi is a Senior Legal and Political Adviser at the Permanent
Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations. Sina holds a J.D. with a
concentration in public international law from the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law and an LL.M. in European Union
law from the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II).

2.

U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.

3.

See UN History: Getting to an Agreement, U.N. FOUND.,
https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/un-history-getting-to-an-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/FV9B-7M6C].
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fall within its mandate – sometimes resulting in devastating
humanitarian costs. Below we outline two innovations – one already
implemented, and the other in the process of being officially presented
to the UN membership – that have the potential to help restrain the
[mis]use of the veto by permanent members of the Security Council.
They both acknowledge the existence of the veto, and rather than
aiming for its abolition they aim to bring its use more in line with the
intentions of the drafters of the UN Charter.

I. Innovation one: A Code of Conduct Regarding
Security Council Action Against Genocide, Crimes
Against Humanity or War Crimes
Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are among the
most serious crimes of international concern, as evidenced by their
recognition as crimes falling under universal jurisdiction. 4 All States
have a responsibility to ensure that such crimes are prevented and that
they are ended and punished where they occur, as follows from the 1948
Genocide Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and customary
international law. 5 Permanent members of the Security Council have a
particular responsibility in this regard, 6 given the Security Council’s
sweeping powers to decide on appropriate measures to restore
international peace and security, and in doing so, preventing or ending
such crimes and the human suffering that they entail. 7
Past failure of the Council to act in the face of atrocity crimes, due
to the use or threat of the use of the veto (in Srebrenica, Rwanda and
Syria, to name a few) 8 have done enormous damage to the standing of
the Organization. 9 Therefore, in 2015, the Accountability,
4.

Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universaljurisdiction# [https://perma.cc/R6J7-V8X4].

5.

Id.

6.

Ambassador Wenaweser, Letter dated 14 December 2015 from the
Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/70/621–
S/2015/978 (Dec. 14, 2015) [hereinafter ACT Code of Conduct].

7.

Roll
of
the
Security
Council,
U.N.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-security-council
[https://perma.cc/285D-BGTB].

8.

See Adapt Peacemaking, Security Tools to Overcome Humanitarian
Crisis, Emerging Crisis Worldwide, Particularly in Syria, Speakers Urge
Security Council, U.N. MEETINGS Coverage AND PRESS RELEASES,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13216.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/AD63-GNVB].

9.

See id.
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Transparency and Coherence (ACT) Group – a collection of 25 small
and medium-sized States at the UN 10 – endorsed a concrete initiative
developed by the Mission of Liechtenstein to help prevent such failures
in the future: The Code of Conduct for Security Council Action Against
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes (“the ACT Code
of Conduct). 11 Under the ACT Code of Conduct, countries make a
voluntary political commitment to support timely and decisive action
to prevent or end crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.12
The ACT Code of Conduct is currently supported by 121 States,
including 10 current members of the Security Council. 13 These States
commit not to vote against a credible draft resolution dealing with
atrocity situations. 14 The Code of Conduct is open to all Member States,
as every State can, in theory, serve on the Security Council and help
end and prevent atrocity crimes. 15 The Code of Conduct is therefore
not only about veto restraint, 16 but also represents a broader pledge to
support timely and decisive Security Council action against mass
atrocities. In joining the ACT Code of Conduct, States simply commit
to do what they can to end and prevent atrocity crimes when they serve
as Council members 17 – which is the least we should expect from those
serving on the Security Council.
The fact that nearly two-thirds of UN States have signed up to the
ACT Code of Conduct 18 demonstrates their dissatisfaction with past
Council failures and their willingness to do better in the future. And, it

10.

ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 1.

11.

See id.

12.

Id.

13.

List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/893
[https://perma.cc/PNC4-C8ZS]. See LIST OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CODE
OF
CONDUCT, https://www.regierung.li/media/medienarchiv/2020-11_CoC_List_of_supporters.pdf.

14.

ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 3.

15.

See id. at 4.

16.

UN Security Council Code of Conduct, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_code_of_co
nduct [https://perma.cc/Y95X-TCCP] (describing the French/Mexico
Veto Initiative as being squarely focused on veto restraint).

17.

ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 3.

18.

List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 13; see also
Membership
of
Principal
UN
Organs,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/membership-principalun-organs/index.html [https://perma.cc/V6CN-LRGL].
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shows that there is a real opportunity to change the political culture in
the Security Council.
The main features of the ACT Code of Conduct are the
following:
•

The crimes covered by the Code of Conduct are genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes – all well
defined in international law. 19

•

The Code is for all States who serve or may, at some
point, become a member of the Council. 20 Security
Council action in response to these crimes requires the
support of all Council members, not just permanent
members. 21

•

This Code of Conduct is thus not just about the veto,
but represents a positive pledge to support timely and
decisive Security Council action to end and prevent
atrocity crimes.

•

The general pledge above is complemented by a more
specific pledge not to vote against credible draft SC
resolutions that are aimed at preventing or ending
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 22

•

There is no procedural trigger for the code to apply. 23
Instead, the Code would be triggered by any situation
involving these crimes – in other words, the facts on the
ground would be the trigger and lead to Security Council
action. 24

•

However, the Code of Conduct foresees an important role
for the Secretary-General as an important authority to
bring such situations to the attention of the Council, and
her or his assessment of the situation would carry great
weight 25.

19.

ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 1.

20.

Id. at 3.

21.

See id. at 1.

22.

Id. at 3.

23.

See id. at 1 (stating that the Code of Conduct is triggered by any situation
involving genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes that leads to
Security Council action).

24.

Id. at 1.

25.

ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 1.
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II. Innovation two: General Assembly Action when
the Veto is (Mis)used
In accordance with Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the Security
Council acts on behalf of the entire UN membership. 26 It is thus
accountable to all UN States represented in the UN General Assembly.27
If the veto prevents the Security Council from acting, the Council fails
to perform its functions against the will of the quantitative majority
required for Council decisions – in many cases also against views of the
overwhelming majority of the UN membership.
While the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, this responsibility is
not exclusive. 28 In accordance with Article 11 of the UN Charter, the
General Assembly may discuss any question relating to the power and
functions of other organs, including the Security Council. 29 The Charter
as well as UN practice encourage complementarity between principal
UN organs. 30 Complementarity is particularly important if one organ
fails to exercise its Charter functions in contradiction to the Charter’s
purposes and principles. 31 Such situations include cases where the veto
prevents the Security Council to act against mass atrocities. As
mentioned above, the ACT Code of Conduct seeks to restrain the use
of the veto in such situations and contains a positive commitment to
act against mass atrocities. 32 Supporting an active role for the General
Assembly in such cases is thus a natural complement to the ACT Code
of Conduct.
The question then becomes: How should the General Assembly deal
with vetoes cast in the Security Council? Calls for an involvement of
the General Assembly date back many years. 33 Another idea developed
by the Mission of Liechtenstein and currently under consultation among
States proposes a simple innovation: The General Assembly will always,
26.

U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.

27.

See id.

28.

Id.

29.

U.N. Charter art. 11.

30.

See id.

31.

See ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 6, at 1.

32.

UN Security Council Code of Conduct, GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_code_of_co
nduct [https://perma.cc/Y95X-TCCP].

33.

See R2P: A Short History, U.N. REGINAL INFO. CTR. FOR W. EUR.,
https://www.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-shorthistory [https://perma.cc/ES5V-ALZW].
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automatically and rapidly be convened if a proposal voted in the
Security Council has failed due to the use of the veto. 34 The General
Assembly’s discussion will be without prejudice to possible outcomes –
meaning that it may or may not take its own decision on the situation
at hand. 35
Under Article 24(3), the UN Charter tasks the Security Council to
submit special reports to the General Assembly when necessary. 36 In
practice, however, such reports are almost never submitted. 37 Given the
far-reaching effect of the veto, the Council will be invited to submit a
special report to the General Assembly in every instance a veto is cast.38
In order to implement this new innovation, a cross-regional group
of States could champion the cause and put forward a General
Assembly resolution that establishes a mechanism to convene a formal
General Assembly meeting, under a dedicated agenda item, every time
the veto prevents the Security Council from acting, independently of
the origin of the veto or the particular situation at hand.
The main features of the veto accountability initiative are
the following:
•

the President of the General Assembly will be mandated
to convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly to
discuss a veto cast by one or more permanent members
of the Security Council within two weeks from its
casting. 39

34.

Press Release, Security Council, Briefer Calls for Interactive, Direct
Mandate-Renewal Consultations Focused on Political Strategy, as
Security Council Considers Working Methods; Delegates Deplore
Inequity, Exclusion of Meaningful Input from Elected Members, U.N.
Press Release SC/13830 (June 6, 2019) (proposing that a meeting of the
General Assembly be automatically convened every time a veto is cast).

35.

Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the U.N., letter
dated Nov. 8, 2019 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (Nov. 8, 2019)
(stating that a debate should take place without prejudice to any possible
outcome and independently of the substance of the resolution that was
subject to a veto) [hereinafter Deputy Letter].

36.

U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 3.

37.

See In Hindsight: The Relationship between the Security Council and the
General Assembly, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (June 28, 2019)
(highlighting the need for better reporting practices by the Security
Council).

38.

Deputy Letter, supra note 35, at 3.

39.

Statement by H.E. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser to President of the
U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 25, 2019) (stating that Liechtenstein
supports a standing mandate for the General Assembly to debate any use
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•

A new agenda item on the use of the veto will be
created. 40

•

The Security Council, in accordance with article 24 (3)
of the UN Charter, will have the opportunity to submit
a special report on the use of veto in question to the
General Assembly ahead of the Assembly’s convening. 41

•

The veto casting member(s) of the Security Council will
be invited to address General Assembly and be given
priority on the list of speakers. 42

Conclusion
The veto has always been a bone of contention in the UN
membership – in fact a majority of Member States, in spite of having
accepted the veto when joining the UN, are formally in favor of its
abolition. 43 That, we believe, is an unrealistic proposal. But clearly the
political paralysis in the Security Council, with the use of the veto as
its ultimate expression, has reached such proportions that the Council
is only able to provide for peace and security in a very selective manner
at best. 44 As we speak, unspeakable crimes are being committed in
Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and sadly elsewhere – largely ignored by the
Security Council, with massive consequences for international peace
and security and with large scale impunity. In Syria alone, hundreds of
thousands of people have been killed, millions have been forcibly
of the veto in a formal meeting, as a measure of accountability as well as
a means to empower this Assembly) [hereinafter Wenaweser Statement]
40.

See generally Meetings Coverage, Calls for Greater Inclusion of Elected
Security Council Members, Limited Veto Use in Addressing Atrocity
Crimes Dominate Open Debate on Working Method, 8175th Mtg.,
SC/13197
(Feb.
6,
2018),
available
at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13197.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/3LFC-TY79].

41.

Wenaweser Statement, supra note 39, at 3.

42.

Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United
Nations New York, Liechtenstein’s position on Security Council Reform
(May
5,
2015),
available
at
https://www.regierung.li/media/medienarchiv/unoallgemein/Lie_Positi
on_on_SC_reform_final_w_attachments.pdf?t=637095471267487388
[https://perma.cc/2HSQ-7794].

43.

Press Release, General Assembly, Member States Call for Removing Veto
Power, Expanding Security Council to Include New Permanent Seats, as
General Assembly Debates Reform Plans for 15-Member Organ, U.N.
Press Release GA/12091 (Nov. 20, 2018).

44.

See generally id.
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displaced, and countless others require humanitarian assistance. 45 In
Yemen, the humanitarian crisis and widespread suffering can be
directly linked to the war crimes being committed. 46 And, in Myanmar,
there has been an utter lack of Security Council action to provide for
accountability for the atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya
and other minorities. 47 Innovative tools to restrain the veto can help
the Security Council to break out of stalemate and live up to its
responsibility under the UN Charter on behalf of the entire UN
membership and in service to all of humanity. If applied consistently
and supported very widely, the veto retraining tools described above
can over time bring about a change in political culture in the Council
– a change that is very badly needed.

45.

See generally Why is there a War in Syria?, BBC (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229
[https://perma.cc/VSJ5-85S6].

46.

See generally World Report 2019: Yemen Events of 2018, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/countrychapters/yemen [https://perma.cc/Z9GH-4PX9].

47.

See generally Press Release, Security Council, Head of Human Rights
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar Urges Security Council to Ensure
Accountability for Serious Violations against Rohingya, U.N. Press
Release SC/13552 (Oct. 24, 2018).
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